And he's spot on......
Article by Jake Niall from today's AGE.
Delusional clubs paying a high price for quick fixes
July 24 2003
Richmond and Carlton supporters might be asking how their clubs, third and sixth respectively in 2001, have been so abysmal since. Their crashes have been neither accidental nor the fault of third parties.
The simple explanation is list mismanagement. The Blues and Tigers have been the victim of delusional assessments of their own playing lists and, in the case of Carlton, the draft penalties will merely prolong the nuclear winter.
Cameron Schwab, now Fremantle's chief executive, several years ago identified that clubs should regard themselves as in one of two definitive states - contending for a premiership or building a team that would eventually be capable of winning one.
Trouble arose, according to the Schwab thesis, when clubs became confused about their intentions or kidded themselves.
It's clear that, in the present socialised system, one of the most dangerous scenarios is for a club to kid itself that it can win a premiership when it clearly cannot. This is precisely what Carlton, with more veterans than the Chinese Politburo, did at the end of 2001 and possibly even in 1999.
Richmond, meanwhile, has acknowledged its misjudgement that it was close to a flag at the end of 2001, when Paul Hudson and Adam Houlihan were recruited and a first-round draft pick sacrificed for the admittedly capable Greg Stafford.
Both clubs chose to "top up" after 2001 and thus missed out on valuable choices in what was easily the strongest draft pool of the past five years. The Blues traded for Corey McKernan, pictured, and Justin Murphy, neither of whom will be around when the Blues are contending again, and consequently did not have a pick until No. 39 (Justin Davies). Jarrad Waite, one of the few present Blues to glow in the present dark age, was taken as a father-son pick that year.
For Carlton, the problem was that the club was addicted to its 1980s methods: buy players, pay top dollar - inside or outside the cap - and never let a decent player leave, Aaron Hamill excepted. Missing the finals was not tolerated, even if it was necessary. The result was the worst list in the competition and the second-highest payroll in 2002. The Blues did not have a succession plan.
Richmond's pathology, as identified by Greg Miller - who often sounds like a management consultant brought in to fix a broken company - is that its decision-makers seldom had the courage to make tough, long-term calls.
The best decision the Tigers have made in the past seven or eight years was to throw away the expendable Chris Bond, improve their draft position and gain Brad Ottens in late 1997.
They almost pulled off a similar coup in 1999, trading up from pick seven to pick three while sacrificing journeyman Steve McKee to Collingwood, but botched the upgraded pick, selecting Aaron Fiora ahead of Matthew Pavlich.
Richmond can usually find a reason to avoid tough calls. Often it's because no one, from president to doorman, feels safe in his position; history tells them that, at Tigerland, a couple of bad seasons means another summer of the long knives.
Few Richmond boards have had the courage to stand firm and educate the supporters, rather than giving in to the bloodlust of the mob. So, the cycle continues. The Tigers miss the eight, feel they have to make it next year and take short cuts that condemn them to mediocrity in the future.
Like Ian Collins, Miller and Richmond president Clinton Casey appear to have identified the disease and are preaching patience. Miller has devised a treatment that involves an aggressive stance on the list and a tighter player payments regime. Now is not the time to be uncontracted at Punt Road.
Carlton's reconstruction will be the greater challenge because it has fewer present players who can be a part of a premiership than Richmond. Carlton's only advantage is that its situation is so dire, supporter expectations are necessarily lower.
Richmond supporters have already endured a nuclear winter; it began in 1983 and, after peeking from the bunker in 1995 and 2001, they are still mired in radioactive times.
This story was found at: http://realfooty.theage.com.au/articles/2003/07/23/1058853136540.html
Article by Jake Niall from today's AGE.
Delusional clubs paying a high price for quick fixes
July 24 2003
Richmond and Carlton supporters might be asking how their clubs, third and sixth respectively in 2001, have been so abysmal since. Their crashes have been neither accidental nor the fault of third parties.
The simple explanation is list mismanagement. The Blues and Tigers have been the victim of delusional assessments of their own playing lists and, in the case of Carlton, the draft penalties will merely prolong the nuclear winter.
Cameron Schwab, now Fremantle's chief executive, several years ago identified that clubs should regard themselves as in one of two definitive states - contending for a premiership or building a team that would eventually be capable of winning one.
Trouble arose, according to the Schwab thesis, when clubs became confused about their intentions or kidded themselves.
It's clear that, in the present socialised system, one of the most dangerous scenarios is for a club to kid itself that it can win a premiership when it clearly cannot. This is precisely what Carlton, with more veterans than the Chinese Politburo, did at the end of 2001 and possibly even in 1999.
Richmond, meanwhile, has acknowledged its misjudgement that it was close to a flag at the end of 2001, when Paul Hudson and Adam Houlihan were recruited and a first-round draft pick sacrificed for the admittedly capable Greg Stafford.
Both clubs chose to "top up" after 2001 and thus missed out on valuable choices in what was easily the strongest draft pool of the past five years. The Blues traded for Corey McKernan, pictured, and Justin Murphy, neither of whom will be around when the Blues are contending again, and consequently did not have a pick until No. 39 (Justin Davies). Jarrad Waite, one of the few present Blues to glow in the present dark age, was taken as a father-son pick that year.
For Carlton, the problem was that the club was addicted to its 1980s methods: buy players, pay top dollar - inside or outside the cap - and never let a decent player leave, Aaron Hamill excepted. Missing the finals was not tolerated, even if it was necessary. The result was the worst list in the competition and the second-highest payroll in 2002. The Blues did not have a succession plan.
Richmond's pathology, as identified by Greg Miller - who often sounds like a management consultant brought in to fix a broken company - is that its decision-makers seldom had the courage to make tough, long-term calls.
The best decision the Tigers have made in the past seven or eight years was to throw away the expendable Chris Bond, improve their draft position and gain Brad Ottens in late 1997.
They almost pulled off a similar coup in 1999, trading up from pick seven to pick three while sacrificing journeyman Steve McKee to Collingwood, but botched the upgraded pick, selecting Aaron Fiora ahead of Matthew Pavlich.
Richmond can usually find a reason to avoid tough calls. Often it's because no one, from president to doorman, feels safe in his position; history tells them that, at Tigerland, a couple of bad seasons means another summer of the long knives.
Few Richmond boards have had the courage to stand firm and educate the supporters, rather than giving in to the bloodlust of the mob. So, the cycle continues. The Tigers miss the eight, feel they have to make it next year and take short cuts that condemn them to mediocrity in the future.
Like Ian Collins, Miller and Richmond president Clinton Casey appear to have identified the disease and are preaching patience. Miller has devised a treatment that involves an aggressive stance on the list and a tighter player payments regime. Now is not the time to be uncontracted at Punt Road.
Carlton's reconstruction will be the greater challenge because it has fewer present players who can be a part of a premiership than Richmond. Carlton's only advantage is that its situation is so dire, supporter expectations are necessarily lower.
Richmond supporters have already endured a nuclear winter; it began in 1983 and, after peeking from the bunker in 1995 and 2001, they are still mired in radioactive times.
This story was found at: http://realfooty.theage.com.au/articles/2003/07/23/1058853136540.html
